Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you each for your contributions this morning.

I’d like to ask each of you this question. In light of your testimony,

in light of what you have heard your other colleagues discuss

this morning, is it each of your opinion that the policy of containment

is now exhausted and we now must face the reality that it does not work?

Some of the testimony that was given this morning by each of

you, some more direct than others, regarding, if I understood this—

in your case, in particular, Dr. Hamza—that any further inspection

regime would essentially be meaningless and useless—so if that, in

fact, is where you are, and I don’t know where the other two are

exactly, then containment doesn’t work, inspections are useless,

and we are just continuing to march around the bush here. So,

therefore, we must face the reality of what we are dealing with, if

this is the case, and move to another policy. Then if that is the

case, what is that policy? Do we have no other option than the military option?

Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I beg the indulgence

of the committee to ask the other two witnesses for a short answer to the question?

Thank you very much. Dr. Hamza. Thank you. Professor Cordesman. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you, and to our panelists,

thank you. We appreciate your contributions today, and the contributions

you made, each of you, to our country. Senator Lugar focused on somethin, and that is, after we have

heard your testimony and you have heard our speeches, and you

might even hear an interview or two after this, we are all for virtue,

democracy, good government, and all things right, but how do

we get there, and that, I think, was Senator Lugar’s point, and I

would ask each of you to focus on a couple of areas and if you

would not mind responding to this question.

General Hoar and Dr. Halperin in their testimony asked a lot of

questions back, and they each laid out a number of dynamics and

factors that we should pay a lot of attention to if, in fact, the military

option is the option, and as we drift along and containment

is not particularly attractive, and we have gone through that for

11 years, and we still have Saddam, and we still have uncertainty, and we still have problems.

So therefore, what is the option, what should we do, and there

are various versions put forward, and I would hope that General

McInerney, when you respond, if you will deal a little bit with the

opposition groups and forces that you keep talking about, which I

am not aware of, but they may be there.

But what I would ask the five of you to focus on is the economic

dynamics of this, the opposition dynamics, the allies, how all that

integrates into something, or maybe it is not important, maybe a

unilateral strike along the lines of what General McInerney is talking

about, clean, crisp, sophisticated, go in and get it done, and maybe that works.

Then what happens afterwards? Who governs? Do any of you

have any idea of an exiled government, of any individual, any

groups that you could put forward to us today as to what happens

after we take this bold strike in the interest of virtue and all mankind?

Now, what follows on? I think General Hoar got into some of those points in his testimony.

So with that, each of you, thank you, and we are always grateful

for your consultation and input, and we would start with you, dean. Mr. Duelfer.

General. General McInerney. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you to our

panel this afternoon, after a long wait. We appreciate you hanging

in there with us. I apologize for missing some of the opening statements,

so I may ask a question here that some of you developed in some detail.

But Dr. Kemp, I heard it said recently on the Iranian dynamic,

if we should invade Iraq, or liberate Iraq, however we phrase it,

that the two options for Iran would be a negative neutrality or a

positive neutrality, and I think that is not a bad way to say it.

I would ask each of you if you could give me your opinion on

what has been suggested in previous panels today that there is a

very clear and defined link between the Arab Palestinian issue and

Iraq. Is that true or not? If it is, how deep is it part of the dynamic

if we would go into Iraq, and I heard some of you mention it, but

I would very much like each of you to give me your thoughts on that. Ambassador Parris.

So you do not see it as a serious impediment?

Ambassador PARRIS. I think it is certainly serious, and it is certainly

an impediment, but I am not convinced that it would stop

this effort in its tracks if it were done properly and intelligently,

and with full concern for the sensitivities that our potential partners have expressed.

Dr. Ajami. Thank you. Dr. Kemp. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I do have a statement,

which I will ask to be included in the record. And since we

are on a limited track here with votes coming, I would suggest we

go right to the witnesses. Thank you very much.

Senator Lugar, thank you. I add my welcome to

our distinguished witnesses and also thank you each for your many

contributions to our country. And this is in line with your continued

contribution, so thank you. We value each of your wise counsel

and we will probably be talking with you often in the days ahead.

Mr. Berger, you, in your testimony, ended by laying out a number

of, as you state, ‘‘tough questions.’’ And yesterday we heard

from many distinguished witnesses who, as a matter of fact, dwelt

in some detail on your questions, your first one being, what impact

will our action have on key governments in the region, such as Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey?

I would ask each of you if you would respond to that question,

your question, Mr. Berger, in this way. What is your opinion as to

if the United States would find itself, as it essentially does today,

alone, and if we would move in a military action to destroy Saddam

Hussein unilaterally, or essentially unilaterally? Is that wise?

Would there be consequences? What, in fact, consequence might

there be for the Governments of Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey?

You mention, Mr. Berger, Iran and the Middle East. I’d be interested

in getting your thoughts on whether you think there is any

connection between the Middle East situation today and Iraq if we

would unilaterally take action against Saddam Hussein. Would

that have any effect on our other interests?

And, I might add, included in that interest, which we passed this

morning a bill out of this committee, framing up a focus for economic,

diplomatic, democratic institution building in Afghanistan.

We seem to kind of glide by that, and it was referenced this morning

by one witness. I think a ‘‘hit and run’’ is what she said—a hit

and run effort in Afghanistan, and that witness acknowledged that

this might be a more difficult undertaking in that we would not

want to model, in fact, our efforts in Iraq if we went into Iraq after Afghanistan.

Now, I’ve thrown a lot of pieces out there, but I would welcome

your thoughts on any of those or all of them. And, Mr. Secretary, thank you again for coming today.

Mr. Secretary, thank you. Mr. Berger. Thank you.

Anything you want me to do, Senator. I’m here. Do you want to go vote?

Well, let’s recess and go vote, and we’ll come back. In the absence of the chairman, I’ll take control. This is revolution here, Mr. Secretary.